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The London Ambulance Service (LAS) attempts to enhance its services through the adoption of a 
Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system is a well known and well documented, if not notorious, 
ongoing narrative of information systems (IS) failure and success (Fitzgerald, Guy & Russo 2005). 
This paper suggests that René Thom’s catastrophe theory (Thom 1989) could be used as a visual 
metaphor, which can be used to interpret the historical saga of this possibly catastrophic and possibly 
successful technological and social change. The capacity of the imagery from ‘cusp catastrophe’ to 
further inform socio-technical practices, gleaned through these interpretations, will also be discussed. 
 




The main aim of this paper is to explore the potential of the of René Thom’s (1989) 
‘Catastrophe Theory’ to help understand information systems development (ISD) and 
deployment, within organizational and societal contexts. Catastrophe Theory is 
deployed here as a visual metaphor to interpretively explore the recurrent occasions 
of catastrophe and competency exhibited by the London Ambulance Service (LAS) in 
its repeated attempts to improve its services. LAS sought to do this through better 
information and information systems (IS) in association with changes to working 
practices and staff/management relationships. The focus is on the manner in which 
computerized IS were seen as a means of enhancing the LAS’s capacity and 
competency in scheduling and delivering effective emergency services (Beynon-
Davies, Paul 1995; Finkelstein & Dowell 1996; Fitzgerald, G 2000; Page, Williams & 
Boyd 1993). This paper proposes that catastrophe theory has the capacity to act as an 
‘ocular analogue’ of the socio-technical landscapes created by the cumulative 
agencies of humans and related non-human informational artefacts, across an 
organizationally self delineated space/time that makes up the LAS. In this way it 
seeks to explore and demonstrate the utility of Thom’s theory as a graphical 
representation, capable of facilitating an understanding of informational successes and 
failures within organizational contexts. The expectation is that this will enable an 
appreciation of the complex behaviours of real world situations, incorporating 
information systems and other artefacts acting in concert, or not, with human 
agencies, as they collectively constitute an organization’s functionality. It is these 
human\machine ('humanchine' networks, see Brooks & Atkinson 2004) and their 
cycles of success and failure that act as a point of departure for the explorations of 
such organizational networks. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Catastrophe theory, as used in this interpretation of 
the dynamic case, is firstly explained. This is followed by narrative accounts of the 
London Ambulance Services’ successes and failures in adopting the Computer Aided 
Dispatch (CAD) system(s) and the ramifications of this for the service and for the 
people of London. The latter is then revisited, and viewed, through the ‘lens’ of 
catastrophe theory, so as to interpretively explore the dynamics of the services’ 
sequence of failure and success. Finally the utility of Catastrophe Theory, in 
comparison with other theories deployed in interpretive information research (such as 
Structuration Theory (ST) (Giddens, Anthony 1984), and Actor Network Theory 
(ANT) (Latour 2005)), is reflected upon in terms of its capacity to contribute to the 
growing set of theories used in the interpretation of real world information systems 
within organizational and societal settings. 
 
Thom’s Topography of Continuity and Catastrophe 
Thom was a highly respected mathematician, the recipient of the Fields Medal for 
mathematics; an award, within his academy, on a par with the Noble Prize for 
literature. His scholastic centre of attention was the manner in which cartographies - 
geometric landscapes - are mathematically represented (Thom 1989) and deployed. 
 
Of particular interest, here, is one of those geometrical landscapes, the ‘Cusp 
Catastrophe’ which accounts for continuity within its topography and instantaneous 
domains of change, i.e. catastrophe (Sheridan & Abelson 1983). For example, Cusp 
Catastrophe can be used to model the behaviour of a stressed dog; which may respond 
by becoming cowed or becoming angry. The suggestion is that at moderate stress, the 
dog will exhibit a smooth transition of response from cowed to angry, depending on 
how it is provoked. If the dog starts cowed, it will remain cowed as it is irritated more 
and more, until it reaches the ‘fold’ point, when it will suddenly, discontinuously snap 
through to angry mode. Once in ‘angry’ mode, it will remain angry, even if the direct 
irritation level is considerably reduced (Flay 1978). As may be seen in a graphical 
analogue of Thom’s topography (see Figure. 1), Cusp Catastrophe offers a three 
dimensional (3D) landscape, with the capacity to represent the dynamics of an 
organisation’s non-linear and possibly disastrous behaviours (it has also been 
previously used to model things such as the failure of a bank (Ho & Saunders 1980) 
and employee turnover (Sheridan & Abelson 1983)). It is proposed that these 
organisational dimensions contribute to behaviours and interactions of humans and 
non-humans that serve to: 
1. Replicate and enhance the organizational functionality. 
2. Destabilize the organization and its functionality. 
3. Vector the organization out of its replicative and destabilized human/machine 
agencies to a higher level of functionality. 
4. Strand the organization in a stasis, i.e. where it is going nowhere. 
 
 
Figure 1. Thom’s Cusp Topology 
This paper suggests that Catastrophe Theory offers a means of representing the 
phenomenology of social/organizational contexts, whose inner workings are 
accessible and whose overt behavioural manifestations of its human and non-human 
actors may be witnessed. Adopting this landscape of catastrophe provides a means of 
visually representing the patterns of agencies and interactions exhibited by humans 
and non-humans, or humanchines, (Brooks, Atkinson & Wainwright 2008), as they 
constitute the socio-technical networks that are organizations. 
 
The socio-technical organization and its functioning may be represented as being on a 
specific trajectory within Thom’s cartographical landscape. These are identified in 
Figure. 2 as functional trajectories A to D: 
A. Advancing in their functionality and/or growth. This is a dynamic trajectory in 
which the organization is becoming increasingly effective in its informated 
socio-technical capability and cohesion, as well as its overall functionality. 
B. Building from a low or non-existent position to increase its functionality and 
start to enhance its informated socio-technical cohesion and capabilities. 
Whether it gets there depends on internal and external contingencies over time 
and its capacity to perform effectively.  
C. Catastrophic in behaviour, having sought to enhance its socio-technical 
functionality and social cohesion the organization fails to maintain both of 
them and falls back over the functional cusp and dissipates or reverts to its 
former state, though stranded and quiescent, in the doldrums (D) of low 
functionality. 
D. Doldrums (stranded in them), having attempted to increase its functionality 
and social cohesion it has initially shown some movement along that vector 
towards advancement; it is now, however, stalled and oscillates between 
entropy and a possible higher level functionality that could, itself, be 
advancement or catastrophe. This domain could also be called 
‘Deconstruction’. 
Each of the domains A – D established in this Thomian landscape, along with the 
landscape itself, will be used interpretively to delineate both the states of the 
LASCAD and the dynamics of its unsuccessful and successful attempts to reconfigure 
its working practices, incorporating a new ambulance dispatch system. 
 
A Catastrophe Theoretical Interpretation of the LAS 
Introduction of Semi-Automated Information Ambulance Dispatch Systems 
To explore the capacity of Thom’s Catastrophe Theory as a conceptualizing device 
for interpreting the dynamics of information systems cases, the (in)famous occasions 
of the LAS’s attempts to introduce an ambulance dispatch and tracking system into its 
control room are explored here. The LAS was, and still is, one of the largest 
Figure 2. The Topographical Domains of Thom’s Catastrophe Theory 
(The diagramming here, and in subsequent versions, draws on the work carried out by 
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ambulance services of its kind in the world. Due to an expansion of its activities, and 
having introduced a (semi)automated ambulance location tacking and dispatch system 
(CAD), it was suddenly confronted by a virtual melt down in its functionality; shortly 
after the CAD’ go-live activation in 1992. Prior to that, ambulances were dispatched 
by a semi-manual system, based on practices built up over many years and the use of 
paper based records. Beynon-Davies (1999, p704) reported that “a flood of 999 calls 
were spontaneously being cleared from the screens.” As a result many calls were not 
being responded to and there was a danger of loss of life. The queues of calls that 
were building up, almost exponentially, were suddenly wiped from the screens. 
 
The consequence of this was that large numbers of calls that had built up were not 
answered. On the 27th October 1992 the inadequate computerized system was turned 
off and established semi manual dispatch practices were returned to. Although no one 
died as a result of the CAD implementation, it had been a high risk experience. The 
outcome of which, was that the existing manual system was resurrected, though some 
of the computerized functions were maintained. At a later date, however, further 
problems occurred in which even the printing out of calls was not possible and a fully 
manual system was instituted as the system could not cope with its task. 
 
The ‘Failure’ of LASCAD Information Systems Realization 
On reflection, which included a House of Commons Select committee’s report, it was 
realized that the changes instituted and the technology adopted in 1992, were simply 
not realized and, that the service and its senior team, including the Chief Executive, 
were not up to the task (Page, Williams & Boyd 1993). As a result the Chief 
Executive and managers were replaced. The factors that lead to this ‘failure’ (and the 
use of that terms is in itself contentious) were many and cumulative. The UK NHS 
was being subjected to number of major reforms in which what had been centrally 
managed services were being devolved into quasi-autonomous ‘Trusts’, with centrally 
allocated performance ambulance response rate targets. There was an urgent need to 
change in response to these and this meant the new CAD system was required. 
Unfortunately the NHS, along with all public sector organizations, was subject to 
European Procurement Rules of the lowest tender wins, i.e. the cheapest option. The 
outcome of all this, was that a small company, ‘Systems Options’, with little 
experience in developing the safety critical, high volume and rapid response 
application that was required had been awarded the development contract. Rather than 
ask the front line dispatch staff to work with the management on the CAD 
functionality, senior managers determined and set down themselves what was the 
required functionality. There was no IS development methodology, such as PRINCE, 
deployed that would have aided both the orchestration of the development process and 
incorporate end-users as active participants within it, while assuring the application 
appropriate functionality. The drive to develop and implement the CAD was 
relentless. When, however, the ambulance dispatch application was finally delivered 
there was no buy-in from the staff; who did not want it the first place. Nor was there 
any attempt at the cultural change required in adopting and utilizing dispatch systems 
to best effect. When the application went live the dispatch system was obviously 
‘…not fit for purpose’, it could not handle the calls coming in. The Senior 
Management reverted to using voice and telephone plus paper records.  
 
The outcomes of this and an accumulation of other non IS factors resulted in an 
exponentially increasing numbers of calls from concerned prospective patients who, 
in turn, were also not responded to. The Service was, as a result, swamped with calls. 
The staff reverted to, in the early morning, manually dispatching the ambulances, 
using call tape recording along with paper-based records and bypassed they, now, 
switched off the CAD. As a result the new CAD was decommissioned due to both its 
obvious lack of fitness for purpose and political concerns. Rumours that a patient had 
died as a result of the LASCAD’s inadequacies, though unproven, were in the public 
domain. Figure. 3 sets out the time line of the LASCAD episode reported here. 
 
 Figure 3. The London Ambulance CAD Failure and Success Time Line 1990 -1966 (Brooks, 
Fitzgerald & Atkinson 2008) 
 
The Chief Executive, as a result of this debacle, resigned along with a number of the 
senior management team. The CAD developer was also signed off. This though did 
not negate the need to increase, through modern dispatch technologies, the efficiency 
and efficacy of the LAS ambulance services.  
 
The ‘Successful’ Introduction of CAD into the London Ambulance Service: 
Forces & Events 
Subsequent to the failure of the London Ambulance Service, in 1996 the LAS CAD 
there was a UK parliamentary committee appointed and a public inquiry was 
commissioned (Page, Williams & Boyd 1993). This reviewed what had happened 
with respect to the London Ambulance Service’s failure to effectively develop and 
implement the changes to the Service and their associated information systems 
applications and technologies. They also made recommendations on future 
developments with respect to the service’s use of technologies though out the service, 
but in particular the ambulance dispatch processes. This, alongside Trade Union 
pressure, led to the replacement of the LAS Chief Executive. The new appointee had 
offered, at interview, a clear vision of how the LAS would be in the future, including 
the role of information systems within it. He also clearly mapped the LAS and its 
CAD development process over the next decade.  
 
As a precursor to the CAD introduction this time, the staff were actively involved in 
introducing other changes, ‘warm up projects’ to the service, ranging from new 
uniforms, and scheduling systems to other technical aspects such as hand held 
telecommunications. A new digital PABX/Automatic Call Distribution System, along 
with a DAT (Digital Audio Tape) capturing all calls and radio traffic, was 
successfully introduced in April 1995, which actively engaged dispatch and other 
ambulance staff. Interestingly, the staff, its Union and the management were still in 
dispute over working terms and conditions. The ambulance dispatch processes, 
themselves, were also being reengineered. This time, instead of going out to external 
tender for a CAD system, the decision was to develop it in-house. To achieve this, 
tight deadlines were dropped and a much greater staff engagement approach along 
with a more positive atmosphere was created around the CAD application 
development; including a better management-Union relationship. The PRINCE 
methodology was used to orchestrate the development processes in a realistic 
timetable and ‘quality assure’ a phased CAD functionality introduction. These 
initiatives contributed to the Service’s organizational capabilities, which led on to an 
enhancement of the ambulance dispatch processes, while getting the control staff used 
to being involved in technology led innovation.  
 
The Ambulance Service, along with the rest of the NHS at that time, was under 
relentless pressure to enhance service efficiency and effectiveness. Despite this 
pressure, the decision was not to be precipitate in introducing a CAD system into the 
Service and certainly via external procurement. The LAS was, at the time, also being 
subject to a major restructuring with the devolving of services to four new divisions 
and a Central London service being introduced. It was essential that the LAS and the 
capital’s population, through its socio-technical ambulance control and dispatch 
system, worked effectively and efficiency to deal with the increasing numbers of 
callouts and non-emergency duties, such as patient transfers, that were required. One 
of the main factors contributing to this success was the co-optation of a Project 
Manager, for the new CAD, with experience in developing information systems 
applications within the public sector, specifically the police and more IT people were 
employed.  
 
An accommodation over pay and conditions between staff, their Union, and the LAS 
management was arrived at, generating an environment conducive to the CAD’s 
development and its subsequent adoption by the staff. No blame was apportioned to 
the staff in respect of the previous failure. The new Chief Executive sought 
engagement with the staff over working conditions and practices as well as the 
introduction of a new CAD system.  
 
Instead of going for the appointment of an external supplier and a big bang 
implementation, as in the previous case, the CAD was built, in-house, over a series of 
steps, prototyping in all but name, led by the newly appointed CAD Project Manager. 
Working, directly, with the dispatch staff, their working manual procedures were 
studied and with the staff’s engagement, subsequently, built into the CAD’s 
functionality. Thereby automating those tried and tested working practices, resulting 
in enhanced performance. As a precaution, the new application had a real time back 
up of all the ongoing calls and responding dispatch processes along with their 
outcomes.  
 
A strong buy-in to the project and its deliverables, by the staff was being engendered 
through the participative approach adopted and the effectiveness of the new Project 
Manager at his job. They would not go totally live with the CAD until its functionality 
and the dispatch staff’s ability to deploy it were assured. Additional moneys had been 
made available to underpin the development of the new CAD. The ancillary, ‘warm-
up’ projects had added to this, in that they broke the ice for change and developed an 
appropriate climate. As the CAD’s functionality came on line, step by step, subtle 
changes to working practices were engendered in the ambulance dispatch and 
management process. The dispatch staff and management were intensively engaged in 
these processes. As a result of all these factors an effective CAD system, and 
associated staff buy-in, adoption and effective utilization was achieved. Not only this, 
but the performance of the London Ambulance Service was itself was enhanced. It 
was reported in the UK House of Commons that the project had been successful 
(Fitzgerald, Guy & Russo 2005). There was no threatening of the near proximity of 
cusp catastrophe of the original, top-down tendered out procurement of the LASCAD, 
rather a participative, effectively in-house, professionally led process of incremental 
development engaging the staff in arriving at an effective socio-technical solution. 
 
Interpreting the LAS Failures & Success using Catastrophe Theory 
The cartography of Thom’s Catastrophe Theory (set out in Figure. 2) is used to 
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Figure 4. Rene Thom’s Cartography of Catastrophe & Competency Applied to the LAS ‘Failure’ & 
‘Success’ Narratives (with Reference to Thompson (1979)) 
interpret and delineate the dynamics of the London Ambulance Service, reported 
earlier, in its attempts at introducing and deploying a CAD system to enhance their 
services and their outcomes (see Figure 4).  
 
LASCAD ‘Failure’ 
The London Ambulance Service, as described in the above narrative in its failure 
mode, was initially in domain D, the Doldrums; here, while it was functioning, it was 
not meeting the forces and event of increasingly onerous demands for emergency 
services made on it by London, along with its population and the British Government 
and the NHS. The LAS Chief Executive sought to move out of the Doldrums (D 
zone) manually, with the attempted computerization of the ambulance dispatch 
processing as the flagship for this initiative; it being demonstrably necessary to 
achieving his strategic intent. The LAS’s functional Doldrums (D zone) were made 
deeper, however, by the ongoing dispute between the management and the unionized 
dispatch and ambulance staff. The attempt to Build (B zone) increased efficiency and 
effectiveness into both the LAS and the new Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) 
application failed when the CAD failed to perform; with nearly Catastrophic effects 
(C Zone) for the Service and populous. However, this organizational and functional 
attempt at Advancing (A Zone) the LAS’s services and dispatch capabilities through 
the CAD and new working practices had the almost opposite effect.  
 
The LAS CAD application ceased working due to an overload of calls and the 
dispatching of ambulance services reverted to the previous Doldrums of manually 
dispatching ambulances. This had the effect of demoralizing the Service and its 
personnel, particularly the dispatch staff. The NHS prescribed modus operandi of 
lowest tender external procurement for the LASCAD, had resulted in a small 
inexperienced developer being chosen to produce the mission critical ambulance 
dispatch system. The result was not only the CAD, but the LAS’s ambulance 
dispatching functionality, literally ‘fell over’ the Cusp horizon coming near to a 
Catastrophic (C Zone) situation for London, and its population with respect to 
emergency services. The ancient regimen, managerial and information systems were 
not that lucky. Their journey over the cusp was, indeed, Catastrophic for them both 
personally and professionally; they and their LASCAD lowest bidder and developer 
had their contracts curtailed. The Chair and Chief Executives left.  
 LASCAD ‘Success’ 
However the LAS, in terms of dispatching of ambulances in response to emergency 
and planned demand, picked itself up out of the Doldrums that was the legacy of the 
earlier regime. Under the guidance of a new Chief Executive and his introduction of 
an information systems developer with public sector experience and a participative 
approach, reinvented and reinvigorated the service and its access to information 
systems and their effective deployment. As reported above, through a number of 
participative pilot projects, the dispatch staff was ‘lifted’ out of the Doldrums in 
which they were stranded. The participative and public sector experienced in-house 
developer delivered them from the despair the LAS had gotten themselves into over 
the CAD. They were able to start Building not only a new CAD, but also an 
invigorated LAS. As a result the LAS, along with its new CAD, was set on 
Advancing across and up the topographical gradient of improving CAD and service 
functionality, avoiding the gravitational influences of the cusp catastrophe over which 
they had previously plummeted to the detriment of themselves, the LAS as a whole 
and, albeit temporarily, the people of London.  
 
The real world narrative of the LAS and the organizational landscape along which its 
constitutive human and non-human technological actors journeyed, in their initially 
unsuccessful and subsequently successful attempts at harnessing the capabilities of a 
Computer Aided Dispatch system, it is argued, here emulates and reflects the 
landscape that Thom has delineated and designated as the ‘Cusp Catastrophe’. In 
doing it so, it is argued, it has added to the ‘smorgasbord’ of social theories, such as 
Structuration Theory (Giddens, Anthony 1984), Actor Network Theory (Latour 2005), 
Autopoiesis (Maturana & Varela 1980) and even Rhizomatics (Deleuze & Guattari 
2004) that constitute the theoretical pallet available to those who pursue interpretive 
insights into information systems within organizational and social contexts (for 
examples of these social theories 'applied' in IS see Atkinson & Brooks 2008; Brooks, 
Atkinson & Wainwright 2008; Whitley & Pouloudi 2001). Catastrophe Theory can 
interpretively account for the dynamics of an informated socio-technical network, as it 
responds to the complexities and forces of its inner and outer environments. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has sought to introduce and explore the concept of the ‘Cusp Catastrophe’ 
as delineated by the mathematician René Thom (1989). In this instance the Cusp 
Catastrophe is adopted and deployed, not as an exacting mathematical theorem, but as 
an extended ‘visual metaphor’. When this is combined with a case study narrative (in 
this instance the LASCAD failure and success stories), it offers a potential for gaining 
interpretive insights into real world phenomenology and demonstrates the interpretive 
utility of the theory itself. It is argued that, like other social theories such as 
Structuration Theory (Giddens, A 1979; Giddens, Anthony 1984) and Actor Network 
theory (Callon 1986; Latour 1996) even ‘Rhizomatic’ post modernism (Deleuze & 
Guattari 2004) and Autopoiesis (Maturana & Varela 1980), Thom’s Catastrophe 
Theory, in particular the ‘Cusp Catastrophe’, has added to the set of theories available 
to the interpretive school of research into information systems (Walsham 2002).  
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